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Tax Treaties-EXCHANGEOF INFORMATIONUSE
OF IRS SUBPOENA
IN RESPONSE
TO SPECIFIC
REQUESTS
FOR INFORMATIONPOWER
United States u. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976).
In late 1971 the Internal ~ e v e n u eService (IRS) issued administrative summonses to A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd. (Burbank)
and the New York branch of the Bank of Tokyo requiring them
to produce books and records relevant to the potential Canadian
tax liability of Westward Shipping, Ltd. (Westward), a Canadian
corporation. The summonses were issued by the IRS in response
to a request for information by Canadian authorities. Westward
filed written objections to the summonses, arguing that they were
not authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or by the 1942 Tax
Treaty between the United States and Canada.' The IRS responded by issuing a new summons to Burbank, purporting to
deal with Burbank's domestic tax liability but requesting the
same materials as did the original summonses. When this new
summons was challenged and stayed, the IRS sought enforcement of the original summonses in federal district court. In this
proceeding, the IRS admitted that the information was sought
because of the request by Canadian authorities for aid in their tax
investigation of Westward and not because of any potential tax
liability of the American corporations. The district court denied
enf~rcement.~
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit r e ~ e r s e d ,holding
~
that the use of the IRS
subpoena power solely to obtain information for use by Canadian
authorities in a Canadian tax investigation was authorized by
section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code and articles XIX and
XXI of the 1942 Income Tax Treaty with Canada.'
-

1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United StatesCanada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983.
2. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9779 (S.D.N.Y., Aug.
1, 1974), reu'd, 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976).
The district court also denied Westward's motion to intervene, but allowed Burbank
and the Bank of Tokyo to challenge the summonses. The denial of intervention was
affirmed by the court of appeals. The intervention issue will not be treated in this case
note.
3. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9,13-14 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976).
4. 56 Stat. 1405, 1406.
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I. BACKGROUND

A.

United States Income Tax Conventions

The 1942 Income Tax Convention with Canada is one among
twenty-two5similar conventions concluded by the United States
with various countries since 1939? Once ratified, these conventions are recognized by the courts as treaties and as part of the
--

5. Treaties in force on January 1, 1976 with exchange of information provisions were:
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 14, 1953, United States-Australia,
[I9531 4 U.S.T. 2274, T.I.A.S. No. 2880; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 25, 1956, United States-Austria, [I9571 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 9, 1970, United States-Belgium,
[I9721 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 6, 1948, United States-Denmark, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 6, 1970, United States-Finland, [I9711 22
U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July
28, 1967, United States-France, [I9681 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Feb. 20, 1950, United States-Greece, [I9541 5
U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 2902; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 7,
1975, United States-Iceland, [I9751 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151; Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 13, 1949, United States-Ireland, [I9511 2 U.S.T.
2303, T.I.A.S. No. 2356; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 30,1955,
United States-Italy, [I9561 7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, IJnited States-Japan, [I9721 23 U.S.T. 967,
T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 18, 1962,
Luxembourg, [I9641 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No.
1855; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 16, 1948, United StatesNew Zealand, [I9511 2 U.S.T. 2378, T.I.A.S. No. 2360; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Norway, [I9721 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S.
No. 7474; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 1, 1957, United StatesPakistan, [I9591 10 U.S.T. 984, T.I.A.S. No. 4232; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Dec. 13, 1946, United States-South Africa, [I9521 3 U.S.T. 3821,
T.I.A.S. No. 2510; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 23, 1939,
United States-Sweden, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, [I9511 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Jan. 9, 1970, United
States-Trinidad and Tobago, [I9711 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 22, 1954, United States-West Germany, [I9541 5
U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133, as amended, Sept. 17,1965,16 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No.
5920.
On May 13, 1976, the Department of the Treasury announced that income tax treaty
negotiations were underway or contemplated in the near future with Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, India, Iran, Jamaica, Malta,
Morocco, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. 41 Fed. Reg.
20,427 (1976). It was also announced that negotiations were nearly completed with Indonesia, Kenya, Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), and South Korea. Id. The following
treaties had been signed: Cyprus (Apr. 19, 1974), Egypt (Oct. 28, 1975), Israel (Nov. 20,
1975), and the United Kingdom (Dec. 31, 1975). The treaties with Egypt and Israel had
also been submitted to the Senate for approval. Id.
6. The earliest tax convention still in force was concluded in 1939with Sweden. Supra
note 5.
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law of the land without any further legislative action.' This recognition arises from article VI of the Constitution, which places the
Constitution, laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, and
treaties made under the authority of the United States all on the
same footing as the "supreme Law of the Land? A distinction
is often made, however, between self-executing and nonselfexecuting treaties; the former being those that take domestic effect upon ratification, the latter requiring enabling legislation?
Income tax treaties considered by the courts have been regarded
as self-executing.l0
The purposes of tax treaties are to prevent double taxation
(taxation by both countries) and tax evasion (taxation by neither
country) in cases where a citizen of one country has income from
sources within another country.ll In order to facilitate these purposes, the treaties usually contain provisions for the exchange of
information between the two countries. Much information is
exchanged on a routine basis, while more detailed information is
exchanged upon specific request.12 For example, article XIX of
7. Samann v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957).
8. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Wright, Treaties as Law in National Courts: The United States, 16 LA.L. REV.755,
756 (1956) states: "In the United States, it is the general principle, deduced from article
VI and other articles of the Constitution, that both treaties and customary international
law are parts of the law of the land, directly applicable by the courts."
9. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829): "Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision."
OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
LAWOF THE UNITED
STATES
4 141 (1965)
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
reads:
§ 141. Effect of Treaty as Domestic Law
(1) A treaty made on behalf of the United States . . . that manifests an intention that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United States at the
time it becomes binding on the United States
(a) is self-executing in that it is effective as domestic law of the United
States, and
(b) supersedes inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress or of the
law of the several states of the United States.
10. See 525 F.2d a t 14, and cases cited note 7 supra.
11. E.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United
States-Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983.
12. E.g., id. arts. XIX-XXI.
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the Canadian treaty provides that each country will furnish the
information that its authorities "have a t their disposal or are in
a position to obtain under its revenue laws" to the extent that
such information may be of use to the other country in assessing
t a x e d 3 Article XXI states that upon request the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue may furnish Canadian authorities such information as he is "entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the
United States."14 The reciprocal situation is also provided for.'"
The use of the provisions to request specific information from
United States tax authorities has been quite limited, except perhaps in the case of Canada,16and there have been no prior judicial
determinations of the validity or interpretation of the provisions. l7

B. Applicable Sections of the Internal Revenue Code
Tax treaties provide no independent compulsory process, but
rather depend on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code? For
instance, the Canadian treaty contains no independent power to
13. Id. art. XIX:
With a view to the prevention of fiscal evasion, each of the contracting
States undertakes to furnish to the other contracting State, as provided in the
succeeding Articles of this Convention, the information which its competent
authorities have a t their disposal or are in a position to obtain under its revenue
laws in so far as such information may be of use to thc authorities of the other
contracting State in the assessment of the taxes to which this Convention relates.
The information to be furnished under the first paragraph of this Article,
whether in the ordinary course or on request, may be exchanged directly between the competent authorities of the two contracting States.
14. Id. art. XXI:
1. If the Minister in the determination of the income tax liability of any
person under any of the revenue laws of Canada deems it necessary to secure
the cooperation of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may, upon request,
furnish the Minister such information bearing upon the matter as the Commissioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States of
America.
2. If the Commissioner in the determination of the income tax liability of
any person under any of the revenue laws of the United States of America deems
it necessary to secure the cooperation of the Minister, the Minister may, upon
request, furnish the Commissioner such information bearing upon the matter as
the Minister is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of Canada.
15. Id.
16. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Convention, 39 FORDHAM
L. REV.
649, 723 (1971); Kronauer, Information Given for Tax Purposes from Switzerland to Foreign Countries Especially to the United States for the Prevention of Fraud or the Like in
Relation to Certain American Taxes, 30 TAXL. REV. 47, 48 n.6 (1974).
17. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. Id. at 12.
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subpoena records, but allows exchange of such information as the
IRS is entitled to obtain under existing United States revenue
laws.lg Under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS
may compel production of records for the following purposes:

. . . [I] ascertaining the correctness of any return, [2] making
a return where none has been made, [3] determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at
law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or [4] collecting any such
liability . . . .
For these purposes the IRS can subpoena books, papers, records,
and other data and require certain persons to appear and give
testimony.20The 1954 Internal Revenue Code also contains, in
section 7852(d), a statement that "[nlo provision of this title
shall apply in any case where its application would be contrary
to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date
of enactment of this title."

C. Use of the IRS Subpoena Power under the Tax Conventions
If there is a potential American tax liability, section 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code clearly authorizes use of the subpoena
power by the IRS to investigate that liability. The specific issue
raised in the instant case, however, is whether the section 7602
subpoena power can be used to gather information in response to
a request from Canada under the tax treaty when there is no
concurrent domestic tax liability. In relation to that issue, the
legislative history of the United States-Canada Tax Treaty and
several others, the Government's interpretation of the Canadian
treaty, and the provisions of three model income tax conventions
will be examined.
The amount of legislative material pertaining to the use of
the subpoena power under the tax conventions is not large.21The
most extensive discussion of the administrative assistance aspects of the treaties occurred during the Senate hearingsZ2on a
-

- -

19. Notes 13 & 14 supra.
20. I.R.C. § 7602.
21. The legislative reports, hearings, and debates on all the income tax conventions
ON INT.REV.
TAX.,LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
through 1961 are reprinted in 1 & 2 JOINTCOMM.
or UNITED
STATES
TAXCONVENTIONS
(1962) [hereinafter cited as LEC. HIST.OF U.S. TAX
CONV.].
22. Convention with France on Double Taxation: Hearings on Exec. A. Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEG.HIST.OF U.S.TAXCONV.,supra note 21, at 945-1129.
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supplementary convention with France13in 1947. This convention
contained information exchange provisions similar to those in the
1942 treaty with Canada.24Much of the testimony, however, pertained to provisions for mutual collection of taxes and to the
amount of information that would be exchanged automatically.
The question of whether the subpoena power was to be used to
gather information in cases lacking concurrent liability was not
discussed directly, although the tenor of the debate suggests that
the participants assumed the subpoena power would be available
for that purpose.25
The report on the 1942 treaty with Canada sent to the Senate
by the Acting Secretary of State states that the exchange of information provisions "mark an important step in the direction of
fiscal cooperation between the two countries" and that the provisions "materially complement our domestic system of information a t the source and, it is anticipated, will be of considerable
value" in administering internal revenue laws. The report also
states that the exchange articles would provide, on a reciprocal
basis, general comprehensive information and "information in
the case of specific taxpayers with respect to whom information
is available in Canada."26 Although it does not deal specifically
with the subpoena power, the report seems to indicate an expectation that the information exchange provisions should have
broad application.
The floor debate on the Canadian treatyn deals more specifically with the issue in the instant case. During that debate Senator George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and floor
manager of the treaty made the following statements:
I do not think that there is anything in the convention
which would require furnishing information beyond what each
Government has the right to ask of its own citizens at the present time.

....
. . . . The convention does not undertake to confer upon

either the United States or Canada any extra power with respect
23. Supplementary Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 18, 1946,
United States-France, 64 Stat. pt. 3 at B3, T.I.A.S. No. 1982.
24. Id. arts. 8, 11.
25. See Hearings on Exec. A., supra note 22, at 28-45 (testimony of Mr. Carroll);id.
at 68-77 (testimony of Mr. Fernald).
26. Report of the Acting Secretary of State on S. Exec. B., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar.
6, 1942, reprinted in 1 LEG.HIST.OF U.S. TAXCONV.,supra note 21, at 448-49.
27. 88 CONG.REC.4642-47, 4713-14 (1942), reprinted in 1 LEG.HIST.OF U.S. TAX.
CONV.,supra note 21, at 461-70.

10191

CASE NOTES

1025

to inquiries made of the citizens of either country. It does not
undertake to confer power upon Canada to make inquiry of an
American citizen residing in the United States, or upon the
United States to make inquiry of a Canadian citizen residing in
Canada.28

But later in the same debate the following exchange took place:
Mr. TAFT. . . .
In other words, if an American citizen were using a Canadian bank deposit to evade income taxation, I think the convention would permit the United States Government to ask the
Canadian Government to obtain information from its own bank
and furnish it to this Government in connection with the enforcement of our internal revenue laws.
Mr. GEORGE. It does provide for exchange of information, as the Senator from Ohio points out.
Mr. TAFT. But no general information of that kind would
be requested except perhaps in specific cases in which inquiry
was being made relative to income-tax evasion.29

Senator Taft's remarks describe a situation in which Canada
would be asked to subpoena records from a Canadian bank solely
to aid an American tax investigation. Since the treaty was meant
to operate reciprocally, if Senator Taft's understanding of the
treaty was correct, the United States could be asked to use its
subpoena power in the converse situation. It is significant that
Senator George appears to have approved Senator Taft's statement. There was no dissenting argument by any of the Senators
present.
The 1962 Income Tax Treaty with Luxembourg contains provision for the exchange of "information available under the respective taxation laws of the Contracting s t a t e ~ . "This
~ ~ is similar to the language in the Canadian treaty describing the information to be exchanged as that which the authorities are in a position to obtain under their revenue laws.31The Senate report accompanying the Luxembourg treaty stated that: "The information to be exchanged is that which would be available under the
taxation laws of the country to which the request for information
is directed if the tax of the requesting country were its own tax."32
28. Id. at 4714.
29. Id.
30. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 18, 1962, United StatesLuxembourg, art. XWI, [I9641 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726.
31. Note 13 supra.
32. S. EXEC.
REP.NO.10,88th Cong., 2d Sess., 38 (1964), reprinted in 1 TAXTREATIES
(CCH) 7 5348, at 5356 (July 27, 1964).

1026

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

This seems to contemplate use of the subpoena power to gather
information in response to a treaty request even though no domestic taxes are involved.
The Treasury Regulations issued pursuant to the 1942 Tax
Treaty with Canada are not helpful in this context inasmuch as
they merely echo the wording found in the exchange of information articles of the treaty.33Regulations to other treaties are simiHowever, the IRS argued in the instant case
larly ~nhelpful.~'
that its position was approved by the State and Treasury Departments and represented the consistent United States interpretation of the treaty.35
The validity of the Government's interpretation of the
United States tax treaties is supported by the League of Nations
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) model income tax convention drafts. The League of Nations Fiscal Committee sponsored model drafts in 1943 and
1946." Both drafts provide for the exchange, subject to reciprocity
and on special request, of "such information in matters of taxation as the competent authorities of each State have a t their
disposal or are in a position to obtain under their [revenue]
laws."37 The commentary to the drafts reads:
The information that may be applied for under this article
may be in the hands of the administration to which the request
is directed or it may have to be secured from an outside source.
This source may be the party concerned himself or persons who,
as a result of their relations with the taxpayer, can give information about his affairs, or resort may have to be made to experts
or w i t n e s s e ~ . ~ ~

The securing of information from outside sources, it seems, would
involve use of the subpoena power.
33. Treas. Reg. Q 519.120 provides:
Under the provisions of Article XXI of the convention and upon request of
the Minister, the Commissioner may furnish to the Minister any information
available to, or obtainable by, the Commissioner under the revenue laws relative
to the tax liability of any person (whether or not a citizen or resident of Canada)
under the revenue laws of Canada.
34. E.g., id. 6 520.118 (Sweden); id. 6 514.116 (France).
35. 525 F.2d at 15.
36. LEAGUEOF NATIONS,
FISCAL
COMMITTEE,
LONDON
AND MEXICO
MODEL
TAXCONVENAND TEXT(1946), reprinted in 4 LEG.HIST.OF U.S. TAX.
CONV.,supra
TIONS,
COMMENTARY
note 21, at 4319,4326.
37. Id. a t 100, 101.
38. Id. a t 49.
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he OECD model draft was promulgated in 1966.39Both the
United States and Canada are members of the 0ECD,40and the
United States has sought to amend many of its treaties to conform to the OECD model.41The commentary to the OECD draft
indicates that upon request for information by one contracting
State, the other State must use the same administrative measures that it would use in investigating its own taxes, even though
information is sought solely to aid the requesting State.'* The
commentary indicates that these measures include special investigations and examinations of business account^.'^ The Treasury
Department has also adopted a model treaty which embodies
these same requirements." This model specifically allows for the
furnishing of depositions and copies of unedited documents such
as books and records.45
II. INSTANTCASE
The district court could find nothing in the 1942 Tax Treaty
or section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code that authorized use
of the IRS subpoena power solely to aid a Canadian tax investigation. Focusing on the phrase in 7602, "determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax," the court concluded
that "internal revenue tax" meant "United States tax" and that
the section 7602 subpoena power should be limited to investigations involving domestic tax liabilities. Inasmuch as the treaty
contemplated use only of existing IRS subpoenas, the court reasoned that the IRS could supply Canadian authorities only with
information already in possession of the IRS or that might be
obtained in the course of legitimate domestic tax investigation^.'^
In reversing, the court of appeals felt that such a limited
construction of section 7602 would frustrate the purposes of the
-

-

39. ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT
DRAFTCONVENTION
FOR THE AVOIDANCE
OF DOUBLE
TAXATION
WITH RESPECT
TO TAXES
ON INCOME
AND CAPITAL
reprinted in 1 TAXTREATIES
(CCH) 7 151
(1966) [hereinafter cited as OECD DRAFT],
(1966).
40. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 1975).
41. Surrey, Factors Affecting U.S. Treasury in Conducting International Tax
Treaties, 28 J . TAX. 277, 277 (1968).
42. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 16 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting the
commentary to the OECD draft).
43. Id.
44. UNITEDSTATESMODEL
INCOME
TAXTREATY,
art. 26 (1976), reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES
(CCH) fi 9767 (1976).
45. Id.
46. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fi 9779, at 85,562.
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Canadian and other similar tax treaties. The court stated that
one of the treaty's purposes was to provide for the exchange of
whatever information might be obtained under the administrative laws of each country in order to prevent fiscal evasion. The
court concluded that even though section 7602 was written to
apply to United States tax liabilities, it should not be construed
to exclude use of the very procedures to which the treaty refers.
Therefore, the court read the treaty as allowing the IRS to use the
same procedures and techniques in investigating exclusively
Candian tax liabilities as could be used in American tax investigations." The court found support for this interpretation of the
treaty in the canon of construction that treaties should be broadly
construed to give effect to their purposes and that when a provision admits of two constructions, one restricting and the other
enlarging rights that may be claimed under it, the more liberal
interpretation is to be preferred.48The court also considered section 7852(d)'s provision that no part of the Internal Revenue Code
should be applied in opposition to any prior treaty obligation and
concluded that the district court's narrow reading of section 7602
would be contrary to the treaty and thus unenf~rceable.~~
Evidence was presented to the court that Canadian authorities do not interpret the treaty to mean that they are required to
subpoena records solely to aid an American tax investigation."
The appellees argued that the treaty should be construed in light
of the Canadian interpretation and that the United States should
not be obligated to provide any more information than Canada
would provide to the United States. The court rejected these
arguments, stating that the official United States interpretation
was not that of the Canadian authorities, and that even if Canada
did not fulfil its treaty obligations as viewed by the United States,
the court still had to sanction fulfillment of American obligations
until such time as the treaty might be denounced. Therefore, the
court concluded that the Canadian interpretation of the treaty
was not relevant in the instant case.51
47. 525 F.2d at 13, 14.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id.
50. In a telephone interview on October 29, 1976, a spokesman for the Canadian
Ministry of Revenue denied that Canada interprets the treaty differently from the United
States in regard to the subpoena power. It was asserted that the decision in i;he instant
case is consistent with Canadian practice in responding to requests for information by the
United States under the treaty. Telephone interview with A.C. Bonneau, Director of the
International Relations Division, Canadian Ministry of Revenue (Oct. 29, 1976).
51. 525 F.2d at 14-15.
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The court also considered the model income tax treaty promulgated by the OECD. The appellees read the information exchange provisions of the OECD draftJ2as not requiring use of the
subpoena power in the instant case and argued that the United
States and Canada must interpret the 1942 treaty consistently
with the OECD draft since no attempt has been made to amend
the 1942 treaty since publication of the OECD draft in 1966."
However, the court found the OECD provisions and the accompanying commentary to be consistent with the interpretation placed
on the 1942 treaty by the IRSJ4
The legislative history of the treaty was only briefly considered by the court in a footnote a t the end of the opinion.55The
court found most of the history to be unenlightening except for
the exchange quoted aboveJ6between Senators George and Taft,
which it found to support the Government's position.

The conclusion that the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada authorized use of the subpoena power in the instant case was correct
inasmuch as it accords with the legislative history of the treaty
and general principles of treaty construction. The interpretation
should have come as no surprise to those familiar with the OECD
draft and the new United States Model Treaty. However, the
instant decision raises serious questions as to the operation of the
exchange of information provisions in United States tax treaties.

A. Implications of the Decision
The decision in the instant case will probably stand as the
interpretation not only of the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada but
of all the tax conventions with similar exchange of information
provision^.^^ The court regarded its decision as necessary to avoid
frustrating all the tax conventions with comparable exchange
provision^,^' and in view of the similarity of the provisions in all
the treaties there is little to suggest that contrary interpretation
by other courts is likely. As a result, American taxpayers52. OECD DRAFT, supra note 39, art. 26.
53. On May 13, 1976, the Treasury Department announced that negotiations on a
new treaty were underway with Canada. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,427.
54. 525 F.2d at 15-17.
55. Id. at 17 n.7.
56. Text accompanying note 29 supra.
57. Note 5 supm.
58. 525 F.2d at 13 n.2.
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particularly large corporations with international dealingsmay have their records subpoenaed by the IRS at the request
of any of twenty-two or more countries.
This prospect is especially disconcerting in view of the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States u. Bisceglia." In
Bisceglia, the IRS had learned that a federal reserve bank had
received from a bank in Kentucky two large deposits of badly
deteriorated $100 bills. Suspecting that the bills represented
transactions that had not been reported for tax purposes, the IRS
issued a "John Doe" summons to the Kentucky bank calling for
production of all books and records that would provide information as to the unknown depositor of the bills. When the bank
refused to comply, the IRS sought judicial enforcement. The district court narrowed the subpoena to include only large deposits
of $100 bills during a one-month period and enforced it as modified. Although the Sixth Circuit reversed,'O the Supreme Court
upheld enforcement of the subpoena, holding that the IRS has
statutory authority to issue a "John Doe" summons to discover
the identity of a person involved in transactions suggesting the
possibility of liability for unpaid taxes."
The full import of Bisceglia is not yet clear. Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion emphasized that Bisceglia is a
narrow decision involving a specific investigation where it was
virtually certain that only one individual or entity was involved
in transactions strongly indicating tax liability and thus does not
authorize an exploratory search where "neither a particular taxpayer nor an ascertainable group of taxpayers is under investigat i ~ n . " ' ~Justice Stewart, however, maintained that "[alny private economic transaction is now fair game for forced disclosure,
if any IRS agent happens in good faith to want it dis~losed."~
At
the least it is clear from the opinion that the subpoena power is
not limited to "investigations which have already focused upon
a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular
potential tax liabilit~."'~
This broadening of the IRS power, which has caused alarm
59. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
60. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
61. 420 U.S. at 144, 151. Other cases sanctioning use of a "John Doe" summons
include United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Turner,
480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).
62. 420 U.S. at 151-52 (Blackmun & Powell, J.J., concurring).
63. Id. at 159 (Stewart & Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 149.
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in its potential domestic a p p l i c a t i ~ nis
, ~even
~
more alarming if
extended through tax treaties to foreign governments to give
them this same ability to investigate unknown taxpayers and pry
into suspicious transactions. If not limited it would grant foreign
nations an awesome power to delve into the affairs of American
citizens. At the same time, to the extent that foreign nations
make treaty requests in cases where American tax liability is
lacking, the IRS will gain access to otherwise unavailable information. There are considerations, however, that may limit the
above effects.

B. Possible Limitations on the Use of Section 7602
In making requests for information under tax treaties, most
countries will likely be motivated by diplomatic considerations to
make their requests as reasonable as possible. In addition, a certain amount of discretion seems to be vested in the IRS in carry, ~ ~ thus the IRS can
ing out treaty requests for i n f o r m a t i ~ n and
also be expected to screen these requests and gather information
in the least intrusive manner. To the extent that these practical
limitations are ineffective, the courts should also be able to act
to curtail extreme or unfair use of the IRS subpoena power. One
limiting factor may be found by the courts in the reciprocal nature of treaty obligations; others may be found in the existing
statutory and case law that provides for judicial enforcement of
subpoenas.
1. Reciprocity

The court in the instant case rejected the notion that if Can65. Note, IRS Subpoena Power to Investigate Unknown Taxpayers, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV.
177, 195 (1975):
Bisceglia, read in the broadest possible way, permits the IRS to subpoena
documents concerning the possible tax liability of any taxpayer, known or unknown. . . . If the requirement of an investigation is not linked to the presence
of a particular person, and the statute is read a t its broadest, third parties such
as banks could be required to produce virtually any records concerning taxpayers a t the third party's expense and with relatively little potential value to the
IRS or the public policy of revenue collection. . . . Since practically everyone
falls within the "regulation" of the IRS, since income tax liability reflects virtually all of one's finances, and since most of one's life can be connected in some
way to these finances, the IRS would have an awesome ability, far greater than
that of any other governmental agency, to delve into individual lives and harass
third parties. Protection is required for the general public as well as for those
directly involved in the transactions.
66. See, e.g., UNITEDSTATES
MODELINCOME
TAXTREATY,
art. 26 (1976), reprinted in
2 TAXTREATIES
(CCH) 7 9767 (1976).
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ada refused to carry out its treaty obligations the United States
would be excused from its reciprocal obligation^.^^ But a different
reciprocity limitation exists in the exchange of information articles of the United States Model TreatyG8and the OECD draft,6g
which provide that a party to the treaty is not required to carry
out administrative procedures that vary from its laws or practice
or from the-laws or practice of the other contracting country or
to supply information that could not be obtained under the laws
of the other country. These provisions embody reciprocity of obligation by placing the exchange of information on a least common
denominator basis. Thus, a country with a narrower subpoena
power than the United States could not take advantage of the
broader measures available to the IRS; and countries whose administrative measures do not include "John Doe" summonses
would not be able to take advantage of Bisceglia.
This limitation clearly exists in the newer treaties, which are
similar to the OECD and United States model treaties,70and in
some of the older treaties." But it may not apply to the 1942
treaty with Canada, since it contains no "lowest common denominator" provision. Inasmuch as treaties both before and after the
1942 United States-Canada Treaty contained the limiting provi~ i o nit, ~appears
~
that the exchange of information with Canada
was not meant to be strictly reciprocal. However, the United
States and Canada are currently negotiating a new income tax
c ~ n v e n t i o n ,and
~ ~ since both are members of the OECD, it is
likely that the new treaty will include the "lowest common de67. Note 51 and accompanying text supra.
68. UNITEDSTATESMODELINCOME
TAXTREATY,art. 26 (1976), reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES
(CCH) fi 9767 (1976).
69. OECD DRAFT, supra note 39, art. 26.
78. The exchange of information provisions of the treaties with Belgium (art. 26),
Finland (art. 29), France (art. 261, Iceland (art. 29), Japan (art. 26), and Norway (art.
28) are substantially similar to those of the model treaties. Note 5 supra.
71. The treaties with Sweden (art XX) and Greece (art. XX), supra note 5, contain
least common denominator provisions similar to those in the model conventions.
72. In addition to the treaties indicated in notes 70 & 71 supra, two obsolete treaties
contained the lowest common denominator provision. Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, July 25,1939, United States-France, art. 24,59 Stat. 893, T.S. No. 988;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 28, 1948, United States-Belgium,
art. XVIII, [I9531 4 U.S.T. 1647, T.I.A.S. No. 2833.
A 1945 convention with the United Kingdom did not contain the provision even
though it was recognized that the British system of information gathering was less comprehensive than that of the United States. Report of the Secretary of State on S. Exec. D.,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 16, 1945, reprinted in 2 LEG.HIST. OF U.S. TAXCONV.,supra
note 21, at 2577.
73. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,427 (1976).
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nominator" provisions of the OECD draft,74in which case a reciprocity limitation will exist upon requests for information by
Canadian authorities.
The least common denominator provisions limit the measures that the IRS is obligated to use to gather inf~rmation.'~
It
is not clear whether the IRS may go beyond what it is strictly
required to do; for instance, whether the IRS could use a "John
Doe" summons even though the requesting country does not utilize such an administrative measure. It seems, however, that in
cases where the recipient of an IRS summons challenges the summons on grounds of improper purpose or overbreadth, the courts
could restrict the IRS to using only those procedures that are
required under the tax treaty. Whether the courts will do so remains to be seen.
2. Judicial enforcement

Under section 7604 of the Internal Revenue Code, an IRS
summons to produce records must be enforced through the federal district courts if resisted by the re~ipient.'~
This provides an
opportunity for the recordholder to challenge the summons on
any applicable grounds.77A limited discovery may be allowed if
neces~ary,'~
and enforcement orders are appealable." Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that to obtain enforcement
of a summons the IRS must show that (1) the investigation will
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (2) the inquiry
is relevant to the purpose, (3) the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and (4) the administrative steps required by the Code have been f o l l ~ w e d . ~ ~
Presumably, all of the above conditions will apply with equal
force when the subpoena is issued for the purpose of providing
foreign tax authorities with requested information. Thus the
74. As members of the OECD, the United States and Canada must notify the OECD
of the reasons why they do not adopt any provision of the OECD draft in any tax convention between them. 4 LEG.HIST.OF U.S. TAXCONV.,supra note 21, a t 4704.
75. Notes 68 & 69 supra and accompanying text.
76. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368,
371-72 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 510 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975).
77. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440,449 (1964); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d
368, 372 (3d Cir. 1975).
78. United States v. Lomar Discount Ltd., 61 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd. 498
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
79. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
80. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
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courts can require that the requesting country provide sufficient
underlying information to justify its request for information and
to ensure that the court's process is not abused.81This is not per
se a limitation on the use of Bisceglia by foreign governments, but
it will a t least permit the courts to pass on the reasonableness of
a "John Doe" summons and to limit or refuse to enforce it if, in
the court's opinion, such limitation or refusal is warranted.
3. Discretionary judicial limitation

a. Burdensomeness. In a number of recent cases involving
the subpoenaing of large numbers of bank records, the banks
complained that compliance with the summonses entailed an
unreasonable financial burden.82Most of the courts were not very
sympathetic to the plea of financial burden as justification for
withholding enforcement of the summonses, and following the
reasoning of the court in United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust
C O .that
~ ~ "the recipient of a summons has a duty of cooperation
and . . . a t least up to some point must shoulder the financial
burden of cooperation," they found that the financial burdens
were not excessive or u n r e a s ~ n a b l e Even
. ~ ~ though financial burden generally will not excuse compliance with an IRS summons,
it may call forth special protection by the courts. In United States
v. Friedman,85it was held that courts have the power to require
the IRS to reimburse a summons recipient for the cost of producing requested records.86Enforcement of the summons may even
81. Id. a t 5 8
Nor does our reading of the statutes mean that under no circumstances may the
court inquire into the underlying reasons for the examination. It is the court's
process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court
may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the
summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other
purposes reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. (footnote
omitted).
82. E.g., United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dauphin
Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
83. 385 F.2d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
84. Id. a t 130. See also United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 530 F.2d 45,
48 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jones, 351 F. Supp. 132, 134 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
85. 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976).
86. Id. a t 938. See also United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp.
418, 421 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that bank should not have to bear more than nominal
costs). But see United States v. Mellon Bank, 410 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
In passing on the need for reimbu/sement, the courts have not focused on specific dollar
limits; rather they have discussed the overall reasonableness of the burdens imposed on
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be conditioned on the payment of such costs by the IRS?'
The bank cases suggest the use of a balancing testRuin determining the burden that recordholders should be required to bear
in complying with a summons. The need of the IRS for the material and the duty of the one having the material to cooperate with
the IRS are to be weighed against the right of the person to be
free from unreasonable impositions by the government. A special
application of the balancing test in tax treaty cases is suggested
by United States u. Harrington," where the c o u j stated that
judicial protection against sweeping or irrelevant orders is particularly appropriate in cases where a subpoena is directed not to
the taxpayer but to a third party who happened to have dealings
with the taxpayer.
In cases where the IRS is seeking information solely in response to a foreign request pursuant to a tax treaty, the courts
should be especially sensitive to the burden placed on the recipient of the summons; consequently, the balancing test should be
weighted more favorably in the recipient's favor. If there is a duty
to cooperate with the IRS in its administration of the tax laws,
that duty is not as strong when the laws are those of a foreign
power. And if judicial protection is appropriate for a third party
receiving a subpoena, that protection is even more appropriate
when the subpoena is issued a t the request of foreign tax authorities. The fact that twenty-two or more countries may be able to
request information through the IRS dictates that the courts exercise controls over the burdens placed on those who possess the
information to protect them from unreasonable impositions.
b. Privacy. The dissent in United States v. Bisceglia expressed concern that the summons in that case would involve the
deposit slips of many innocent depositors and thus apprise the
IRS of their identities?O The concern that a summons would infringe on the privacy of uninvolved parties and give the IRS unthe summons recipient. Where the cost involved is not beyond that which the recipient
may be reasonably expected to bear as a cost of doing business, the summons will be
enforced without reimbursement. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d a t 938. Willingness
on the part of the IRS to furnish labor or copiers may also be relevant. United States v.
Mellon Bank, 410 F. Supp. a t 1069.
87. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 1976).
%.-United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418, 420 (C.D. Cal.
1975). See also Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 203-04, 213 (1946).
89. 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); accord, United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749,
754 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 946 (1975).
90. 420 U.S. a t 156 n.2.
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warranted access to information was dealt with rather cursorily
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Conti~ ~that case, the court simply stated
nental Bank & Trust C O .In
that although a search of the bank records of uninvolved parties
had not been justified as relevant to a legitimate purpose, the
bank had not suggested that the IRS was "attempting to investigate indirectly persons whom it could not investigate directly."92
A similar problem arises when the IRS subpoenas records
solely to aid a foreign government's investigation where there is
no potential tax liability. In such a situation there is no legitimate
purpose beyond that of satisfying a treaty request to justify the
investigation. Accordingly, if the IRS is allowed to examine the
subpoenaed records or to record the information before passing it
on to the requesting country, then the IRS is being allowed to
"investigate indirectly persons whom it could not investigate directly," and governmental access to private information is correspondingly increased.
A strong collective private interest exists in minimizing the
opportunities for the IRS to pry into private affairs and in curtailing the flow of information into government computer banks.93
The possible infringement of that interest in situations such as
the instant case suggests that action similar to that of the district
court in United States v. Friedman" may be appropriate. In that
case, where IRS agents would have seen the bank records of many
uninvolved parties in the course of their investigation, the judge
held that the IRS had to pay to have the bank's employees search
.~~
tax treaty
the records and extract the relevant i n f o r m a t i ~ nIn
cases a further order could be made limiting the right of the IRS
to examine or copy the records before passing them on to the
requesting country.
91. 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 50.
93. One author, after noting the broad range of uses, both proper and improper, that
can be made of information obtained by the IRS (e.g., criminal prosecutions, exchanges
with other federal agencies, political purposes, and harassment) said:
In federal tax investigations, therefore, it is not only the private interest of
a particular individual or group to be free from harassment which must be
placed on the scale . . . . Rather, it is the collective private interest of all
citizens in keeping potentially enormous investigative power within bounds
which is to be considered.
Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Appraisal of the Investigative
Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. Rev. 657, 664-65, 667
( 1965)(emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
94. 388 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.
1976).
95. Id. at 970.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If the interpretation given the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada
by the Second Circuit is applied to the twenty-one other tax
treaties currently in force, a broad power will be created for foreign governments to inquire into the affairs of Americans. The
courts can limit these effects somewhat, but the greater responsibility rests with the legislative and executive branches. It seems
doubtful that all the ramifications of the exchange of information
provisions have been considered by those involved in the negotiation or ratification of the tax treaties. The subpoena power is
perhaps a necessary adjunct to the information exchange provisions in cases where there is no domestic tax liability. If the power
is necessary, Congress should take appropriate action to limit the
conditions under which information is available and the methods
by which it is to be collected and transmitted. Legislation could
be passed to require that the Government bear all costs incident
to collecting requested information. This would alleviate much of
the burden on those who have their records subpoenaed. The IRS
could also be required to use only Office of International Operations9' personnel to gather and transmit information to requesting
countries; the communication of information to other branches of
the IRS could be prohibited. This would prevent the IRS from
using treaty requests from foreign governments as a tool to gather
information for its own purposes. Finally, a body outside the IRS
might be created to screen incoming requests in order to ensure
that foreign nations are not using the tax treaties for improper
purposes such as prying into American business and private dealings.
96. The Officeof International Operations is the branch of the IRS primarily involved
(CCH) 1033-3
in handling matters arising under the tax treaties. 1 INT.REV. MANUAL
( 1976).

